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THE SKEPTIC’S GUIDE TO
INFORMATION SHARING AT SENTENCING
Ryan W. Scott *
ABSTRACT
The “information sharing model,” a leading method of structuring judicial
discretion at the sentencing stage of criminal cases, has attracted broad support from
scholars and judges. Under this approach, sentencing judges should have access to a
robust body of information, including written opinions and statistics, about previous
sentences in similar cases. According to proponents, judges armed with that information
can conform their sentences to those of their colleagues or identify principled reasons for
distinguishing them, reducing inter-judge disparity and promoting rationality in
sentencing law.
This Article takes a skeptical view of the information sharing model, arguing that
it suffers from three fundamental weaknesses as an alternative to other structured
sentencing reforms. First, there are information collection challenges. To succeed, the
model requires sentencing information that is written, comprehensive, and representative.
Due to acute time constraints, however, courts cannot routinely generate that kind of
information.
Second, there are information dissemination challenges.
Sharing
sentencing information raises concerns about the privacy of offenders and victims. Also,
the volume and complexity of sentencing decisions create practical difficulties in making
relevant information accessible to sentencing judges. Third, the model’s voluntariness is
an important drawback. The information sharing model rests on the heroic assumption
that judges will respond to information about previous sentences by dutifully following
the decisions of their colleagues. That is unrealistic. Judges just as easily can disregard
the information, ignore it, or even move in the opposite direction.
Despite those grounds for skepticism, information sharing can play a valuable role
as a supplement to other sentencing reforms. In particular, information sharing would
benefit from a system of sentencing guidelines, whether mandatory or advisory, and from
open access to the information on the part of defense counsel and prosecutors.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, prominent scholars and judges in the United States have proposed an
“information sharing model” for structuring criminal sentencing decisions.
In
indeterminate sentencing systems, which prevailed throughout the United States until the
1970s, judges enjoyed broad and essentially unchecked discretion to select the
appropriate punishment for criminal offenses. With broad statutory ranges, no appellate
review, and no obligation to give reasons for their decisions, judges largely were left to
their own intuitions in choosing a sentence. One consequence was stark inter-judge
disparity. Similarly situated offenders stood to receive widely disparate sentences
depending on the values, preferences, and biases of the sentencing judge. Another was
that no rational and principled body of sentencing law could develop. To address those
weaknesses, reformers in the 1970s and 1980s proposed various methods of structuring
sentencing decisions.
One leading approach, which I will describe as the information sharing model, has
attracted strong scholarly support and is experiencing something of a renaissance. The
idea is that judges should have access to a robust store of information about previous
sentences in similar cases. Armed with statistical data, details about past offenses and
offenders, and written opinions from similar cases, sentencing judges can achieve better
results. Information sharing will promote inter-judge consistency and rationality, the
argument goes, because judges who understand the reasons for previous sentences can
conform to them or identify principled points of distinction. A distinguished and varied
group of scholars and judges has endorsed some form information sharing at sentencing,
including Marc Miller, 1 Michael Wolff, 2 Kate Stith and José Cabranes, 3 Nancy Gertner, 4
and Robert Sweet. 5
The information sharing model is frequently advanced as an alternative to more
intrusive forms of structured sentencing, such as sentencing guidelines. Already
“sentencing information systems” and other forms of electronic data sharing form a
crucial component of the sentencing process in some U.S. states and in jurisdictions
overseas. Missouri, for example, has attracted national attention for its “informationbased discretionary sentencing system,” which strives to equip sentencing judges with
better data about previous outcomes in similar cases. 6 And just last year, Ireland’s
criminal courts launched an ambitious sentencing information system as a national pilot

1

Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems,
Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1381 n.95 (2005); Marc
Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Need for Written Sentencing Opinions, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 3, 2021 (1989).
2
Michael A. Wolff, Missouri’s Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
95, 101 (2006).
3
KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
168-77(1998).
4
Nancy Gertner, Confronting the Costs of Incarceration: Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 261, 279–80 (2009).
5
Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common Law of Sentencing: Developing Judicial Precedent in
Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 927, 938 (1996).
6
See Ryan W. Scott, How (Not) To Implement Cost as a Sentencing Factor, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. ____
(forthcoming 2012).
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project. 7 Meanwhile, mounting interest in “evidence based” sentencing, using tools like
risk assessment instruments, has highlighted the need for better information sharing
infrastructure for sentencing judges. 8
Surprisingly, however, the literature rarely grapples with basic questions about the
information sharing model. Is information sharing at sentencing feasible? Can courts
and other stakeholders in the criminal justice system effectively collect, disseminate, and
make use of a large volume of information about criminal sentences? Can the
information sharing model achieve its objectives, reducing inter-judge disparity and
promoting rationality?
Count me a skeptic. For structural and practical reasons, voluntary information
sharing is a poor stand-alone model for promoting consistency and rationality in
sentencing law. Despite considerable enthusiasm among scholars and commentators,
there is little evidence that the information sharing model can serve as an effective
alternative to other structured sentencing models. Nonetheless, information sharing can
operate as a valuable supplement to other reforms, especially sentencing guidelines. And
previous experiments with information sharing at sentencing offer important lessons
about what works. Think of this Article as a “skeptic’s guide” to the information sharing
model. It advances related three sets of claims.
The first set of claims is conceptual. Information sharing suffers from
fundamental weaknesses as a mechanism for promoting inter-judge consistency and
rationality. There are daunting information collection obstacles. To achieve its
objectives, the information sharing model depends on case-level sentencing information
that is written, comprehensive with respect to relevant facts, and representative of
outcomes in similar cases. But because of the complexity of sentencing decisions, there
is reason to doubt that sentencing courts can routinely generate that kind of information.
There are also formidable information sharing obstacles. Sentencing judges rely on
highly sensitive personal information about offenders, raising privacy concerns about any
program of data dissemination. Also, as a practical matter, it is difficult to make the large
volume of relevant information available to judges in a useful format. The voluntariness
of the information sharing model is also an important drawback. The model assumes that
judges will respond to information about earlier sentences by dutifully aligning their
decisions with others. That is unrealistic. Judges can just as easily disregard the
information, ignore it, or even move in the opposite direction from their colleagues’
reasoning, at the expense of inter-judge consistency and rationality.
The second set of claims is empirical. To illustrate challenges with information
collection, this Article contains an original empirical study of data reporting practices
from a federal district court. The study analyzes more than 400 “Statement of Reasons”
documents, which federal judges must complete in connection with every criminal
sentence. Because the documents are ordinarily nonpublic, the study is the first of its
kind in the United States. The results reveal that, despite mandatory reporting
requirements, judges rarely provide the kind of written opinions necessary to support an
effective information sharing model. In 48.6% of cases in which a written description
was required, the sentencing judge did not provide one. Just 6.0% of cases prompted a
7

Carol Coulter, Website on Court Sentencing Launched, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at 4.
See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based Sentencing,
64 SMU L. REV. 1329 (2011).
8
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written explanation of approximately one page of discussion or more. And the class of
cases in which the judge provided a lengthy explanation differed in important ways from
the population of criminal cases as a whole. The study thus confirms some of the
challenges that courts face in collecting written, comprehensive, and representative
sentencing information.
To illustrate challenges with information sharing and voluntariness, the Article
discusses two previous experiments with the information sharing model. Several
jurisdictions in the United States and in foreign countries have developed “sentencing
information systems” (SISs), interactive computer systems designed to provide judges
with statistics and other information about previous sentences in similar cases. Yet no
research has shown that SISs contribute to inter-judge consistency and rationality, and
most systems have atrophied due to judicial neglect. Similarly, a handful of federal
district courts in the 1970s experimented with “sentencing councils,” which are voluntary
meetings of sentencing judges to discuss upcoming cases. Research revealed, however,
that the councils failed to reduce inter-judge disparity because the sentencing judge
retained discretion to disregard the council’s advice. Today they are all but abandoned.
The third set of claims is prescriptive. If the Article’s conceptual and empirical
claims are sound, then two features of a sentencing system might make information
sharing more effective in promoting inter-judge consistency and rationality. First,
information sharing is more likely to succeed as a supplement to a system of sentencing
guidelines, rather than a stand-alone mechanism for structuring sentencing discretion.
That is because guidelines provide a shared vocabulary about sentencing, operationalize
complex sentencing concepts, and channel the attention of sentencing courts. Second,
information sharing would have greater impact if defense counsel and prosecutors enjoy
open access to the store of sentencing information. Although open access would
accentuate privacy concerns, harnessing the adversary process would greatly improve the
visibility of sentencing information and help guard against errors.
Thus, although styled as a “skeptic’s guide,” the Article expresses cautious
optimism about the information sharing model. A carefully designed information sharing
system can improve sentencing outcomes. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that voluntary
information sharing, standing alone, can meaningfully reduce inter-judge disparity or
promote rationality in sentencing law. Information sharing therefore should be
considered a supplement, not an alternative, to other structured sentencing reforms.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the information sharing model
and the broad support it has attracted among scholars and judges as a mechanism for
reducing inter-judge disparity and improving rationality in sentencing outcomes. It also
distinguishes the information sharing model from two popular alternatives: the “common
law” model the “sentencing guidelines” model.
Part II develops the Article’s conceptual claims, describing the formidable
obstacles an information sharing model will face. Information collection will be difficult
because the model depends on case-level information that is written, comprehensive, and
representative. Information sharing will raise legal concerns about offender privacy and
practical concerns about the usefulness of statistics and case information. Voluntariness
also can undermine the information sharing model by leaving judges free to ignore or
repudiate the reasoning of their colleagues.
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Part III develops the Article’s empirical claims. It first reports the results of the
empirical study, illustrating the challenges in collecting information using unique data
from sentencing documents in a federal district court. It then discusses two analogous
reform efforts, sentencing information systems and sentencing councils, and the mostly
discouraging research concerning their effectiveness.
Part IV develops the Article’s prescriptive claims. It contends that the
information sharing model would be more effective as a supplement, not an alternative,
to other reform efforts. In particular, it contends a system of sentencing guidelines and
open access to sentencing information would improve the chances of success.
I. THE INFORMATION SHARING MODEL
Among scholars and judges, one frequently discussed method of structuring
sentencing decisions is the robust exchange of information among sentencing judges.
That approach—call it the “information sharing model”—differs from alternative
structured sentencing reforms, such as sentencing guidelines or a judge-made common
law of sentencing. Yet proponents believe that it can accomplish many of the same
goals, reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity and promoting rationality in sentencing
law.
A. Two Key Objectives of Sentencing Reform
In “indeterminate” sentencing systems, which prevailed in almost all U.S.
jurisdictions until the 1970s, judges enjoyed essentially unfettered discretion in choosing
the type and severity of sentences. 9 Grounded in the once-dominant theory that
rehabilitation was the principal goal of criminal punishment, indeterminate sentencing
sought to maximize judges’ ability to “individualize” sentences and thereby help
offenders to become productive members of society. 10 Legislatures, in defining criminal
offenses, often authorized a wide range of punishments. For a single violation, for
example, the court might have the option of imposing a fine, or a period of probation, or a
term of imprisonment ranging anywhere from a few days to many years. 11 Few
jurisdictions provided any rules or guidance about how to select an appropriate
punishment. The decision of the sentencing court was essentially unchallengeable, with
no right to appeal. 12 In fact, judges had no obligation even to give reasons for the
sentence selected. 13 By design, this “black box” gave judges enormous discretion to
tailor sentences to the needs of criminals.
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, indeterminate sentencing came under sustained
criticism by scholars and policymakers, and in the last 30 years criminal sentencing has
undergone radical transformation. Calls for structured sentencing addressed a wide range
of concerns, including dissatisfaction with the rehabilitative ideal and a desire for “truth
9

STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 9-11.
Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 389 (2006); see United States v.
Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.) (judges were expected to choose
sentences “almost like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical judgment”).
11
E.g. Bank Robbery Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-235, 48 Stat. 783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113 (2006))
12
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 9 & 197 n.3.
13
Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 542, 543 (Michael Tonry
ed., 1998).
10
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in sentencing” undermined by parole. But two central claims of sentencing reformers are
particularly relevant here.
First, indeterminate sentencing produced unacceptable levels of inter-judge
sentencing disparity. 14 Vested with enormous discretion and subject to little oversight,
judges were largely left to their own intuitions in selecting an appropriate sentence. As a
result, the preferences, philosophy, and biases of the judge played an important role in
determining the sentence. Similarly situated offenders, convicted of similar crimes, could
receive starkly different sentences depending on which judge was assigned to the case. 15
Reformers argued that inter-judge disparity offends fundamental rule-of-law values such
as equality, objectivity, and consistency. 16 For those reasons, inter-judge disparity also
harms the reputation of the courts. 17 In addition, inter-judge disparity potentially
undermines the deterrent effect of criminal law by making punishment less certain and
predictable. 18 Hoping to achieve greater consistency between judges, Congress identified
the reduction of inter-judge disparity as its primary goal in the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984. 19 Many state legislatures have followed suit. 20
Second, indeterminate sentencing resulted in irrational sentencing law. With
sentences overwhelmingly unexplained and unreviewable, neither courts nor legislatures
had developed well-reasoned, intelligible, and principled sentencing law. Reformers
hoped to develop a more rational system in which sentencing courts would thoughtfully
develop a body of coherent sentencing rules and principles. Congress cited improved
“rationality” in sentencing decisions as an anticipated and desired benefit of the

14

The term “sentencing disparity” requires clarification, because it is essentially meaningless standing
alone. Many “disparities,” or differences, between sentences are entirely justified based on legitimate
differences between offenses and offenders. Whether particular differences between sentences are justified
is contestable, and depends on some underlying theory of punishment. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of
Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997). Throughout this Article I refer to “inter-judge
disparity,” by which I mean differences in sentences driven not by differences in offense or offender
characteristics, but by the preferences, personality, and biases of the sentencing judge. See also Ryan W.
Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 n.23 (2010).
15
See Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 274 (1977) (describing the
evidence of serious inter-judge sentencing disparity as “overwhelming”); ANTHONY PARTRIDGE &
WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE
JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 36 (1974); Kevin Clancy et al., Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of
Sentence Decisions and the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524,
525-26 (1981).
16
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5, 10 (1973); Elyce H. Zenoff,
Sentencing Disparity, at 1449, 1450, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (Sanford H. Kadish, ed.
1983).
17
Memorandum from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Hon. William K. Sessions III, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2 (June 28, 2010), available at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/annual_letter_2010_final_062810.pdf
18
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The
First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 237 (1989).
19
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 45 (1983) (“Sentencing disparities that are not justified by differences
among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the public.”); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, at 1.2 (1987); Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).
20
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann., § 244 app. § I; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101.
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 21 Many states too have identified rationality as a key
goal of sentencing reform. 22
To be sure, there is lively debate among scholars about whether inter-judge
consistency and rationality in sentencing ought to be high-priority goals. 23 Excessive
concern about sentencing “disparity,” for example, may distract attention from other
important goals in designing a just sentencing system. 24 Rather than attempt to resolve
that debate, however, this Article accepts for the sake of argument that inter-judge
consistency and rationality are desirable. Not only is that premise enshrined in law in
many jurisdictions, 25 but structured sentencing reforms are often advertised as a way of
achieving those objectives. 26 It is fair to ask whether they can deliver on their promises.
To reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, reformers have proposed
a variety of structured sentencing models. One prominent model is a system of
sentencing guidelines. Although there is considerable variety in guidelines systems,
sentencing guidelines generally consist of detailed rules promulgated by an independent
sentencing commission. 27 At sentencing, the judge is required to make factual findings
about the offense conduct, the effect on victims, and the offender’s criminal history and
personal characteristics. Based on those factors, the guidelines specify a sentence or
sentencing range (such as 63-72 months of imprisonment). In some systems, the range is
“mandatory” or “presumptive,” binding judges to impose a sentence within the guideline
range except in unusual circumstances. 28
In others, including federal system, the
guideline range is “advisory” and thus allows a greater degree of flexibility and
discretion. But the judge nonetheless must make the required findings, accurately
calculate the guideline range, and give due consideration to that range when selecting a
sentence. 29
Another model with broad support among scholars is a “common law of
sentencing.” In the common-law model, sentencing decisions are subject to review by
appellate courts and may be reversed or altered. Although there is considerable variety in
how the common law may operate—the appellate courts’ power to vacate or revise, the
standard of review, the prevalence of “guideline judgments”—the essential feature of a
common law of sentencing is the regulation of sentencing judges by other courts in the
21

S. Rep. No. 225, at 120 (1983) (stating that sentencing reforms are intended to provide “enough guidance
and control of the exercise of [sentencing] discretion to promote fairness and rationality . . . in
sentencing.”).
22
E.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101 (directing the sentencing commission to “establish rational and
consistent sentencing standards”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2153(a) (similar).
23
Kate Stith and José Cabranes, in particular, disavow those objectives as driving purposes of their
proposed reforms. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 172-73 (emphasis removed).
24
See, e.g., id. at 106, 121-24 (calling the reduction of inter-judge disparity “a worthwhile goal for
sentencing reform,” but also a “complex goal” that should not be the “myopic focus”); Kevin Cole, The
Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1337 (1997); Albert Alschuler, The Failure
of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991).
25
See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 58-62, 63-65 and accompanying text.
27
Richard F. Sparks, Sentencing Guidelines, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1457, at 1458
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
28
Sentencing guidelines in Minnesota, Washington, and Kansas fit that description.
29
For example, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines operate in that manner following United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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judicial hierarchy. As described by Kevin Reitz, the powers of appellate courts in the
common-law model include “determinations of the eligible goals of punishment
decisions, and the creation of legal doctrine that translates those objectives into rules of
decision.” 30 Like other bodies of common law, a common law of sentencing evolves
incrementally as appellate courts announce rules, carve out exceptions, draw distinctions,
and occasionally overrule their prior decisions. But it culminates in a body of binding
precedent, and sentencing judges must impose a sentence in conformity with that case
law or risk reversal on appeal.
B. The Information Sharing Model in Action
Another leading model for structuring sentencing discretion is the information
sharing model. A host of prominent judges and scholars has endorsed some form of
information sharing as a way to structure judicial discretion in criminal sentencing. 31
Under this approach, when imposing sentence, judges should have access to a store of
information—statistics, written opinions, and other case information—about previous
outcomes in similar cases. 32 Marc Miller has long urged more thorough judicial opinion
writing and data dissemination to facilitate the development of coherent and principled
sentencing law. 33 He has also written extensively on “sentencing information systems,”
searchable databases of sentencing data, as a possible “reform” for broken structured
sentencing regimes. 34 Justice Michael Wolff has extolled the advantages of an
“information-based discretionary sentencing system” whose centerpiece is voluntary
information sharing to assist sentencing judges. 35 Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes, in
their influential work criticizing the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, have argued that the
“basic model” for regulating sentencing discretion should be guidance from other judges
through written opinions and data about previous cases. 36 Judge Nancy Gertner has
proposed extensive information sharing among sentencing judges at the federal level,
urging federal judges to consult sentencing statistics and written opinions as a way to
“make better sentencing decisions in each individual case.” 37 Similarly, Judge Robert
Sweet has proposed that judges should have access to a store of written opinions and
statistics—a combination of “common law principles and modern technology”—that

30

Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and
State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1454 (1997).
31
Eric Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25,
102 (2005) (describing the information sharing approach as “embraced by many scholars and jurists”).
32
Id. (describing a model in which “today’s courts draw[] upon the analysis and conclusions of prior
judicial opinions”). Luna describes this model as a “common law of sentencing.” In this Article, I reserve
the term “common law” for a system of binding precedent developed by the courts, rather than one
grounded in voluntary information sharing. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
33
Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough, supra note 1, at 20-21.
34
Marc Miller, Sentencing Reform “Reform” Through Sentencing Information Systems, in THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT (Michael Tonry ed. 2004) at 121.
35
Wolff, supra note 2, at 95.
36
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 170-71, 176.
37
Gertner, supra note 4, at 277.
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would improve sentencing decisions. 38 J.C. Oleson, among others, has endorsed
sentencing information systems as a method of facilitating evidence-based sentencing. 39
Recently, the information sharing model has attracted high-profile attention
among policymakers. In February 2012, testifying before the U.S. Sentencing
Commission about the future of the federal sentencing guidelines, representatives of the
Judicial Conference of the United States stressed the crucial role of information sharing
for sentencing judges. 40 As Judge Paul Barbadoro explained, judges “appreciate
knowing whether their sentences are in step with other sentences by other judges for
similar cases,” and they need a sentencing system that provides that kind of
information. 41 In September 2010, the State of Missouri, which has explicitly embraced
the information sharing model, made national headlines for its efforts to shape sentencing
outcomes by giving judges access to more information about punishment costs. 42
Overseas, in August 2010, the criminal courts of Ireland launched a web site designed to
share information about sentencing outcomes, the product of an ambitious four-year
effort to coordinate the actions of sentencing judges. 43
A real-world example can illustrate the operation of the information sharing
model. In Missouri, the state legislature and courts have chosen information sharing as
the principal method of regulating sentencing discretion. Missouri sentencing law in
some ways resembles a traditional indeterminate system: within broad statutory ranges
specified by the legislature, judges are free to impose any sentence. 44 No appellate
review of sentences is available, except to the extent that a sentence falls outside the
statutory range. 45 Neither the legislature nor a sentencing commission provides guidance
to judges about eligible purposes of punishment, or about factors to consider at
sentencing. 46 And nothing in state law requires that judges issue written opinions—or

38

Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 938.
Oleson, supra note 8, at 1341-42; J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the
Twenty-Fifth Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 744 (2011); see also
Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk Assessments and
Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQUESNE L. REV. 707, 728 (2011).
40
Testimony of Judge Paul J. Barbadoro before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Feb. 16, 2012, at 9-10 &
available
at
n.27,
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/2012021516/Testimony_16_Barbadoro.pdf.
41
Id. at 9; see also id. at 9 n.27 (quoting Judge Richard Arcara’s testimony that it is “crucial” for judges to
have “information about how the sentence that we are considering compares overall with sentences
recommended for this type of conduct”); id. at 10 n.27 (quoting Judge Jon McCalla’s testimony that
“historical data” on sentencing is “greatly valued” and necessary to allow judges to “to make the difficult
decisions required in sentencing on a consistent basis”).
42
See, e.g., Monica Davey, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2010; Deniz
Koray, New sentencing matrix shows Missouri judges the cost of prison, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN, Sept. 29,
2010; Heather Ratcliffe, Missouri judges get penalty cost before sentencing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 14, 2010.
43
Carol Coulter, Website on Court Sentencing Launched, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at 4.
44
Scott, supra note 6, at __.
45
See State v. Cook, 440 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Mo. 1969).
46
Wolff, supra note 2, at 97 (because “[t]here is no overt guidance in Missouri law as to the purposes for
punishment,” judges must “approach sentencing pragmatically and, to a degree, subjectively”).
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even statements in open court—giving reasons for the sentence imposed. 47 By design,
“[j]udicial discretion is the cornerstone of sentencing in Missouri courts.” 48
Yet Missouri strives to lend structure to sentencing decisions by insisting upon
“fully informed discretion.” 49 The Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission (MSAC),
charged by the legislature to make recommendations about sentencing, 50 has created an
interactive web site to share sentencing information. 51 Using the web site, judges and
lawyers can fill out a form that captures key offense and offender characteristics. Based
on that information, the system reports recommended, aggravated, and mitigated
sentencing options. 52 The recommendations do not reflect the Commission’s own
judgments, but “reflect sentencing practices of Missouri’s judges” based on years of
historical data. 53 The idea is that judges should have access to accurate and up-to-date
information about what their colleagues have done in cases that share those
characteristics. Importantly, the information is provided on a “purely voluntary” basis.54
Judges have no obligation to take the information into account, or even look it up. But
the MSAC believes that, by providing useful information, it can win the “hearts and
minds” of judges and persuade them to follow its recommendations. 55 It is the perfect
strategy for the “show me” state: Show judges the information, then leave them alone.
As the Missouri example makes clear, the information sharing model differs
sharply from other forms of structured sentencing, like sentencing guidelines or a
common law of sentencing. It is intended to assist sentencing judges, rather than
constrain them. 56 Information is generated by the judiciary for its own benefit, not
imposed by an external regulatory body like a sentencing commission. The information
sharing model does not depend on legal rules that block judges from selecting sentences
outside a specified range (as in a mandatory guidelines systems) or in conflict with
binding precedent (as in a common-law system). To the contrary, judges retain
essentially the same wide discretion present in an indeterminate sentencing regime. Nor
does the information sharing model compel judges to make any specific determinations
or to focus on particular factors (as in an advisory guidelines system). Instead, the
information sharing model insists, in Judge Gertner’s words, that “judges need to see
what other judges are doing.” 57 The information sharing model arms judges with better
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information, but leaves them free to consult and consider that information strictly on a
voluntary basis.
Proponents of the information sharing model contend that it can accomplish the
same goals as other structured sentencing reforms. Information sharing will reduce interjudge disparity, the argument goes, because disparity between judges principally results
from a lack of information about what other judges have done in similar cases. 58 Closing
the “information gap” will thus close the “disparity gap.” Judge Robert Sweet has
predicted that an information sharing model based on written opinions and sentencing
statistics “would provide, almost automatically, a firmament of reference points and a
body of reasoning developed by the courts,” thereby “alleviating unwarranted disparity”
between judges. 59 Similarly, Judge Gertner argues that making sentencing opinions
available to other judges is “critical” to “cabining discretion” because “[i]n order to avoid
inter-judge disparities, judges must be able to see the decisions made in the courtroom
next door.” 60 Noting that judges frequently agree about the ordinal ranking of offense
severity, even when they disagree about the cardinal severity of sentences, Stith and
Cabranes predict that simply requiring written sentencing opinions and disseminating
sentencing data—to serve as “quantitative guideposts to judges”—will reduce inter-judge
disparity. 61 In recommending Missouri’s approach, Justice Wolff remains “hope[ful]”
that voluntary information sharing will “eliminate some of these overall disparities and
gross differences.” 62
In addition, proponents argue, the information sharing model will produce more
rational sentencing law. For one thing, the process of exchanging information will
encourage more thoughtful decisions. Robust exchange of information, Judge Gertner
explains, would encourage judges “to give coherent explanations, to articulate rules of
general application” as part of a continuing dialogue among sentencing courts.63
Prompting judges to “think through” every sentence, and to explain their reasons for the
benefit of their colleagues, will improve the quality of the resulting decisions. 64 At the
same time, information sharing at sentencing would encourage more principled decisions.
For Judge Sweet, an important advantage of a robust store of information about previous
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cases is that it will produce a “coherent and ever-adapting body of law” that helps to
intelligently translate “broad sentencing policies to individual cases.” 65
Importantly, information sharing is not mutually exclusive with other reform
efforts, like sentencing guidelines or a common-law model. Indeed, many scholars
endorse some combination of approaches. Stith and Cabranes, Judge Sweet, and others
endorse information sharing as a supplement to a judge-made “common law of
sentencing.” 66 Judge Gertner and the Judicial Conference of the United States seek to
promote information sharing in the federal system to support a system of advisory
sentencing guidelines. 67 They reason that, even in jurisdictions with more formal or
intrusive structured sentencing programs, information sharing can serve a valuable
function. Sentencing law should assist judges, even as it constrains them.
Nonetheless, for several reasons, it is useful to disentangle the information
sharing model from other approaches. First, some jurisdictions (including Missouri and
Ireland) have adopted what might be called a “pure” information sharing model, in which
the sole mechanism for structuring sentencing decisions is a program of formal
information sharing. An assessment of information sharing at sentencing is of crucial
relevance to legislators, judges, and other stakeholders in those systems.
Second, proponents of the information sharing model frequently recommend it as
an alternative to more intrusive reforms, especially sentencing guidelines. In Missouri,
the MSAC describes its information-based discretionary system as the product of a
conscious choice between two models: information sharing, designed to assist judges
and to win their approval; and a “regulatory,” “rule-driven system” of sentencing
guidelines that can hope to command merely “obedience.” 68 In Ireland, the information
sharing model was advertised and embraced as a way “to avoid the proliferation of
mandatory sentences with all their flaws.” 69 The same scenario has played out in other
jurisdictions, with the information sharing model positioned as a direct competitor to
alternative reforms like sentencing guidelines. 70
Third, the information sharing model deserves separate attention because it
fundamentally differs from “command and control” reforms like sentencing guidelines
and judge-made common law. It rests on different assumptions about how legislators and
sentencing commissions can influence judges, and faces different challenges in shaping
sentencing outcomes. Whether as a stand-alone system or as a supplement to more
elaborate regulations, the information sharing model is designed to perform a distinct
function, worthy of separate consideration.
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II. FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESSES OF THE INFORMATION SHARING MODEL
There is reason for skepticism that information sharing can meaningfully reduce
inter-judge disparity and promote rationality in sentencing law. Conceptually, the
information sharing model suffers from three fundamental weaknesses. First, there are
challenges in collecting sentencing information. To succeed, the information sharing
model depends on written, comprehensive, and representative information about
sentencing practices, but as a practical matter that information is difficult to assemble.
Second, there are challenges in disseminating sentencing information. Privacy concerns
on the part of offenders, coupled with challenges in making the information accessible
and useful for judges, arise even if extensive information is available. Third,
voluntariness presents serious challenges. By ignoring or disregarding information about
how their colleagues have handled similar cases, judges can exacerbate inter-judge
disparity and undermine rationality.
Before reviewing the empirical evidence and possible strategies for overcoming
them, a description of each set of challenges is in order.
A. Information Collection Challenges
The most daunting challenge to the information sharing model is collecting
sufficient information about the reasoning and results of past sentencing decisions. To
succeed, the information sharing model requires a store of information about previous
cases—for example, written opinions, offense and offender data, or aggregate statistics—
made available to judges at sentencing. But two characteristics of sentencing decisions
make information sharing particularly difficult in this context.
One is volume. Courts in the United States impose a staggering number of
criminal sentences each year. Because plea bargaining has become the dominant method
of adjudicating guilt or innocence, only a tiny fraction of cases end in trial. 71 Roughly
two-thirds of criminal cases, however, end in a guilty plea, conviction, and sentence. 72 In
state systems, each year more than 1.07 million adults receive a sentence for a felony
conviction. 73 In the federal system, more than 81,000 criminal sentences are imposed
annually. 74 Those overall figures also mask considerable variability in volume between
jurisdictions and courtrooms. In some state courts, judges may impose 50 sentences per
week, or more than 2,000 per year. 75
The other is complexity. Sentencing decisions typically require that judges
consider a startling number of factors. Under a typical sentencing statute, the judge must
take into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding both the offense and the
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personal characteristics of the offender. 76 The offense may be limited to a single
incident, or it may involve a sprawling series of actions over many years. The judge must
consider the offender’s acts, omissions, and state of mind, as well as the harm caused by
the crime. Considering the offender’s personal characteristics requires a review of the
offender’s entire life, before and after the offense. The number of moving parts is
staggering: criminal history, assistance to the government, educational background,
employment history, mental health, good deeds, public service, drug and alcohol
addiction, childhood opportunities, family life, prospects for treatment, actions in pretrial
detention, and on and on. In the words of one federal probation officer, at sentencing a
judge must consider “a narrative of the individual from the day of his birth to the moment
of his conviction.” 77 And the inquiry does not end with the defendant, since the court
also may consider how the sentence would affect the offender’s family, the victims, and
the victims’ families. 78
Compounding the complexity, sentencing judges must consider those facts in
light of a wide range of purposes of punishment, which may be in tension with one
another. Most jurisdictions in the United States have a “laundry list” statute that directs
sentencing judges to take into account retribution, general and specific deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and various and sundry other goals, without assigning
priority to any of them. 79 In many corners of legal doctrine, judges and lawyers complain
about the hopeless imprecision of “multi-factor balancing tests.” Think of sentencing as
the ultimate example: a test with an infinite number of factors and no instructions about
how to balance them.
Those features of sentencing decisions make it difficult to generate the kind of
robust store of information required to support the information sharing model.
Specifically, to reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, the information
made available to judges must consist of (1) written information, (2) comprehensive with
respect to material facts, and (3) representative of other sentences in similar cases. On
each score there is reason for skepticism.
1. Written Information About Sentences
Initially, the information sharing model depends on sentencing information that is
written. It is not enough that judges identify relevant facts, formulate reasons, choose a
sentence, and then enter judgment. Those facts and reasons must be reduced to writing,
and collected in some central store of information, if future courts hope to rely upon them
for guidance. 80
76
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At a minimum, that means a lot of data entry. For each case, someone would
need to record information about the case, perhaps working from a long checklist of
relevant offense and offender characteristics. Given the complexity of sentencing
decisions, the amount of information collected in each case could be enormous, and the
process correspondingly costly. In the federal system, for example, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission employs around 30 full-time staff to review sentencing documents and
perform data entry, 81 and many states handle a much higher volume of criminal cases.
The deeper problem, however, is that the information sharing model requires
more than raw data. A checklist of facts, standing alone, is a poor substitute for a written
sentencing opinion because it does not disclose the judge’s reasoning. Although it may
suggest possibilities, documenting potential aggravating or mitigating factors, it captures
neither the factors the judge deems most relevant nor the judge’s process of prioritizing
and balancing them. Leaving future judges to guess about the rationale for the sentence
would not improve the rationality of sentencing outcomes. The information sharing
model strives to foster a thoughtful and continuing dialogue in which judges discern the
basis for previous sentences, and then either accept that reasoning or draw principled
distinctions. Such a dialogue is impossible without some written account of the judge’s
reasoning. Thus, as proponents readily acknowledge, written opinions are the lifeblood
of the information sharing approach. 82
There is reason to doubt, however, that sentencing courts can generate enough
written opinions to support effective information sharing. For years, scholars have been
urging sentencing judges to issue full-fledged published sentencing decisions more
frequently. 83 Yet the overwhelming majority of sentencing decisions in the United States
remain unpublished—indeed, never written down. 84
Typically, rather than prepare a written explanation, the judge announces the
reasons for the sentence in open court. Although many sentencing hearings are audiorecorded, most are not transcribed because they are never needed. 85 And even if a written
transcript is prepared, only a fraction of those transcripts ever become public or otherwise
available to other judges in future cases. 86
Hearing transcripts, moreover, do a poor job of capturing the judge’s reasoning.
Statements in open court are primarily directed at the offender, lawyers, witnesses, and
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observers in the courtroom—not future judges. 87 Often cluttered with irrelevant material,
jarred by interruptions, and disorganized, a sentencing transcript is a poor substitute for a
written opinion explaining the reasons for a sentence. 88
The vanishingly small rate of written sentencing opinions is not the product of
laziness or obstinacy. District court judges operate under acute time constraints. As
Frank Bowman has observed in another context, “[t]he coin of the realm, the scarcest
resource, in federal district court is time,” and many judges understandably “begrudge the
time it takes to deal with sentencing issues.” 89 The sheer volume of sentencing decisions
forces judges to forego a written opinion in most cases.
2. Comprehensive Information About Sentences
Second, to accomplish its goals, the information sharing model depends on
sentencing information that is comprehensive. A written opinion or other record of a case
must capture the full range of potentially relevant facts and factors—including, crucially,
those that the judge does not find especially salient. Otherwise future judges cannot
reliably compare new cases to previously decided cases.
To illustrate the need for comprehensive information, suppose that two judges
impose sentence in identical burglary cases. Both offenders violently broke into a private
residence at night, armed with a loaded handgun, and stole personal property worth
$5,000 before being confronted by the terrified homeowner. Both offenders also pleaded
guilty, expressed remorse, have identical criminal histories consisting of a single petty
juvenile conviction five years ago, and enjoy strong support from loving families.
The first judge imposes a sentence of two years of probation. In a written
opinion, the judge explains that there is no need for a prison sentence in light of the
offender’s spotless criminal record, prospects for rehabilitation, and low risk of
recidivism. But the opinion is not comprehensive. It notes the dollar amount of the theft,
but does not specifically mention the handgun or the fact that the homeowner confronted
the burglar.
The second judge reads the written opinion and mistakenly believes that the cases
are very different. The second judge imposes a sentence of three years of imprisonment.
Unlike the first case, the judge reasons, this case involved an in-person confrontation
with a homeowner startled by a burglar in the middle of the night. That encounter, along
with the loaded handgun, made this offense much more dangerous and the offender more
culpable. Those factors, in the second judge’s view, outweigh the others.
The result is stark inter-judge disparity, although the judges did not realize it.
Even though the offenses and offenders were in fact identical, the second judge received
incomplete—and therefore misleading—information about the earlier case. Without
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comprehensive written opinions, capturing even factors the judge deems relatively
unimportant, the information sharing model can malfunction. 90
Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt that comprehensive sentencing information
can be routinely captured. Every criminal sentence involves a slate of aggravating factors
and a slate of mitigating factors. The task of the sentencing judge is to weigh those
competing considerations and strike an appropriate balance. 91 Written opinions,
however, rarely disclose and detail all potentially relevant factors. They are designed,
after all, not merely to announce the sentence but also to persuade the reader that the
sentence is reasonable. Judges naturally focus on the facts and factors they find most
persuasive while downplaying others. 92
Time constraints exacerbate the problem. Even a judge committed to writing a
comprehensive opinion would find the task time-consuming. The complexity of
sentencing decisions, which require a wide-open inquiry into dozens of competing
considerations, makes it difficult to predict, disclose, and discuss all factors that future
judges might find relevant. Judges cannot undertake that effort often.
The review structure of sentencing decisions also makes it tempting to write an
abbreviated opinion. In any given case, there is little risk that the judgment will be
questioned because no other district court judge reviews the case or writes a dissent.93
Although appellate review of sentences is available in most jurisdictions, criminal
defendants frequently waive the right to appeal, 94 and in any event the chances of a
successful appeal are very low. 95
Moreover, when judges anticipate that the parties may appeal from a sentence,
they have strategic incentives to provide fewer details. Judges do not like to be reversed
on appeal, 96 and detailed sentencing opinions sometimes increase the risk of reversal. An
appellate court might be forced to vacate and remand based on a stray reference to a
prohibited factor, or a misstatement of a relatively minor fact, or an inartful phrase that
sounds too much like a legal error. Outside of especially complex or controversial cases,
writing a long opinion is asking for trouble. A simple announcement from the bench or a
terse written order gives the parties little to go on, and therefore little to attack.
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In theory, exhaustive data entry could compensate for gaps in the written
explanation. A member of the court staff, for example, could complete a checklist in
every burglary case that indicates the presence of a weapon or an encounter with a victim.
That way, future judges could see a complete picture of the case even if the written
opinion contains omissions. As a practical matter, however, such comprehensive data
entry is prohibitively costly. Every sentencing decision involves a theoretically infinite
number of facts and factors, especially when including those not relevant in the particular
case. No court system realistically can code and transmit that kind of hyper-detailed
information for every sentence. 97 Accordingly, the need for comprehensive information
forces a choice between keeping data-collection costs manageable and preventing errors
that undermine inter-judge consistency and rationality.
3. Representative Information About Sentences
Third, to accomplish its goals, the information sharing model depends on
sentencing information that is representative. According to proponents, information
sharing reduces inter-judge disparity and promotes rationality by giving judges a
“context” or “picture” of how each new case compares to previous cases. Judges can
then align their sentences to fit that picture. 98 The trouble is that, in several ways, the
picture can be skewed.
One possibility is that the body of sentencing information may disproportionately
reflect some kinds of cases. Judges, after all, do not choose at random whether to write a
detailed sentencing opinion. Sometimes a judge chooses to issue a published opinion
because the sentence presents a novel legal issue, and the bulk of the opinion is dedicated
to that issue. 99 Other times a judge chooses to issue a published opinion because the case
is unusual. Because of the extreme facts, or the controversial result, or the unusual
degree of public interest, or some otherwise extraordinary aspect of the case, the judge
feels the need to provide an extended explanation of the reasons for the sentence. 100
Time constraints not only make it impossible to prepare a written explanation in every
case, but also force judges to be selective about which sentences warrant extended
discussion. Given the choice, judges often focus on groundbreaking, extreme, or
otherwise special cases.
That kind of imbalance, although understandable, presents serious problems for
the information sharing model. A store of sentencing information that consists
disproportionately of extreme or unusual cases is incomplete, and therefore potentially
deceptive, as a guide for judges in ordinary cases. Indeed, it can cause the information
sharing model to backfire. Relying on a skewed body of information can undermine
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rationality by creating inconsistency with “invisible” sentences that did not warrant a
published opinion. 101
Another risk is that the body of sentencing information may disproportionately
reflect the work of especially prolific judges. It is no insult to the judiciary to recognize
that different judges have different levels of enthusiasm for criminal sentencing. Some
judges, such as those Doug Berman has inducted to a mock “Sentencing Judges Hall of
Fame,” 102 relish the task and would eagerly participate in an inter-judge dialogue about
sentencing outcomes. But many others have little patience for sentencing, and little
inclination to invest more time in preparing written opinions. 103 Given the option, some
judges may contribute more and better information than their colleagues.
That poses a problem for the information sharing model because a nonrepresentative store of sentencing information, dominated by some voices while others
remain silent, can exacerbate inter-judge disparity. Future judges, guided by a skewed
sense of previous sentencing patterns, might inadvertently misalign their decisions with
those of less prolific judges. The risk is particularly acute if “outlier” judges contribute
more opinions and information than their colleagues—a plausible scenario, since judges
have a special incentive to write a detailed opinion when they suspect that others may
disagree with the outcome.
B. Information Dissemination Challenges
Another set of challenges for the information sharing model relates to the
dissemination of sentencing information. Once collected, information about previous
cases must somehow be made accessible to sentencing judges. Yet because sentencing
often turns on highly sensitive personal information about offenders, information sharing
raises privacy concerns. In addition, there are practical hurdles in making relevant
sentencing opinions and statistics accessible to judges.
1. Privacy
Sharing sentencing information with far-flung courts raises serious privacy
concerns. A written sentencing opinion or case record may disclose personal information
about the offender. Sentencing courts frequently rely on the offender’s criminal history,
including any juvenile criminal record. Judges may also consider the offender’s medical
history, mental health, and physical condition, which may serve as mitigating factors at
sentencing. Work history and opportunities for employment may factor into the
offender’s prospects for rehabilitation. The court may also discuss the offender’s home
and family life, including his performance as a parent, obligation to care for young
children, or support from relatives. In some cases, mitigating facts at sentencing include
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profoundly personal information about the offender, such as a history of sexual or
physical abuse. 104
Victims and other third parties also have privacy interests at stake. Sentencing
courts often emphasize the harm caused to victims of crime, which may require a
discussion of medical, psychological, or economic injuries. Witnesses who testify at
sentencing, on behalf of the offender or the government, sometimes provide personal
information and seek to keep their testimony confidential. For a host of reasons,
evidence at sentencing may be submitted under seal. Yet a written opinion or case record
designed to offer future judges a comprehensive picture of the case must, of necessity,
disclose that information.
Of particular concern is information about cooperation with the government.
Offenders frequently receive a lower sentence because of their assistance to police or
prosecutors, and a written sentencing opinion or case record may indicate the nature and
extent of that cooperation. Sentencing courts may also rely on the statements of
cooperating witnesses who appear at sentencing, at trial, or before a grand jury. That
information is potentially explosive because it may expose the offender or family
members to violence and retaliation. The risk is chillingly real in the Internet age, when
web sites like “Who’s A Rat?” make it easier than ever to identify and locate people who
cooperate with the government. 105
Courts’ treatment of presentence reports (PSRs) underscores those privacy
concerns. A PSR is a written document, usually prepared by a member of the court staff
or probation officer, designed to assist the judge at sentencing. In most jurisdictions, a
PSR is prepared as a matter of routine in felony cases. 106 Like a written opinion or case
record, the PSR may contain personal information about the offender, victims, family
members, or third parties. 107 Recognizing those privacy interests, courts have a
longstanding practice of maintaining the confidentiality of PSRs. 108 Indeed, for decades,
it was controversial to disclose the report even to the offender. 109 Disclosure to third
parties is almost always forbidden. As one federal judge put it, “I guess I feel strongly
that such information should not be made accessible to anyone outside the case.” 110
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2. Accessibility and Relevance
Another challenge in disseminating sentencing information is ensuring that the
relevant information is easily accessible. As noted above, the information sharing model
depends on a pool of information that is written, comprehensive, and representative. 111
Beyond that, however, judges also need some way to wade through the available
information and zero in on what is useful. For information sharing to reduce inter-judge
disparity, sentencing judges need a way to find similar cases, comparing previous
sentences with a new set of facts. Only then can they impose a sentence along the same
lines. Likewise, for information sharing to promote rationality, sentencing judges need to
consult the reasoning of other courts in relevant cases. Only then can they write an
opinion accepting that reasoning or distinguishing the case, for the benefit of future
judges.
Accordingly, a centerpiece of the information sharing model is some system—an
electronic database, a web site, or a set of shared files, for example—that allows
sentencing judges to search for previous decisions that are similar and relevant. But
because of practical challenges in building such a system, judges may be discouraged
from making effective use of the available information.
First, the complexity of sentencing decisions complicates the design of any search
system. With a theoretically infinite number of variables in play, no search form or user
interface can capture them all. Instead, the designers of the system of necessity must
select some search parameters to include, while ignoring others. 112 That process is
subjective and controversial.
For example, a system might allow judges to search previous sentences based on
the offender’s criminal history. But that kind of search could take many forms. It may
be implemented as a yes/no field (i.e. did the offender have any prior criminal history?).
Or it might include two yes/no fields, one for juvenile criminal history and another for
adult criminal history. Or it might include a single scaled search parameter that captures
the total number of prior offenses, or the total number of adult offenses, or the total
number violent offenses, or all of the above. Or it might include search parameters based
on the offender’s age at the time of his first offense, or at the time of the most recent
offense, or a hundred other variations. As the designers of one sentencing information
system lamented, “[i]t does not take a mathematical wizard to realize that if there are
even as few as three or four levels of these [criminal history] variables, there are over 700
combinations of aspects of this one variable—criminal record.” 113 One researcher
estimates that the total number of combinations of criminal history parameters alone
“would reach into the tens of thousands.” 114 Even the massive datafiles created by the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, which are breathtaking in their complexity, could not
support searches on many of the criminal-history factors described above. 115
111
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Many other factors relevant at sentencing are equally complex and difficult to
operationalize. The problem is that there no “right” design. Each variation of those
search parameters is potentially relevant, and different judges may prefer different
options. By picking some limited number for searching, and excluding others altogether,
system designers risk alienating judges. Why bother with a search system that seems
focused on all the wrong issues?
Worse, the subjectivity of search parameters can threaten inter-judge consistency.
Suppose, for example, a search system allows judges to search for cases in which the
offender’s criminal history included any “violent” prior offenses. Although judges might
broadly agree that violent criminal history is highly relevant at sentencing, they may
disagree about what offenses qualify as violent or nonviolent. The hypothetical case
described above, in which an armed burglar confronts a homeowner at night but never
fires or even brandishes the firearm, might be a close case. If judges’ differing views
about what qualifies as “violent” are embedded into the search parameters, the system
may “lock in” inter-judge disparity by concealing the disagreement from future users. 116
Nor would full-text searching of written opinions solve the problem. In other
contexts, judges (and their law clerks) typically find relevant case law using electronic
services like Westlaw and LexisNexis, which offer sophisticated search tools. 117 Flexible
as they are, however, those services would have significant limitations as a means of
reliably identifying similar cases. The language that judges use to describe offense and
offender characteristics varies enormously from opinion to opinion, making it easy for
factually similar cases to escape notice. 118
Second, the volume of sentencing decisions makes the search for similar cases
difficult. If the system provides too few search parameters, judges may discover that an
overwhelming number of cases seem relevant. 119 At a high level of generality, each case
may be “similar” to hundreds or even thousands of others. Given their time constraints,
sentencing judges cannot carefully review so many potentially relevant cases. 120
Presented with a daunting volume of matches, judges may give up.
court supervision. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, VARIABLE CODEBOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS
7-80 (2010). The Commission’s data do not, however, capture which prior incidents were “violent,” or the
age of the offender at the time of each incident, or the time elapsed since each incident, or the name or type
of court that adjudicated the prior incident.
116
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If, on the other hand, the system provides too many search parameters, then
searches frequently will yield no results. In sentencing, no two cases are exactly alike,
any more than two human beings are exactly alike. Indeed, a key premise of the
information sharing model is that judges can develop more rational sentencing law by
offering principled reasons to distinguish between dissimilar cases. As a practical matter,
however, judges who search for matching cases and constantly come up empty may
conclude that the exercise is a waste of time. This level-of-generality problem should not
be overstated, as diligent legal researchers know that if one search returns 10,000 results,
and the next returns zero, they should continue to refine their parameters until the results
are manageable. Nonetheless, the volume of sentences creates special challenges in
making relevant results readily accessible to judges.
The volume of sentencing decisions also can threaten the accuracy and usefulness
of the information. The information sharing model anticipates that sentencing judges will
serve both as producers and consumers of information. In that sense, all judges are
interdependent, relying on one another to make contributions to a central pool of
information. For some judges, however, a crushing case load or other time constraints
may result in errors or hurried and unhelpful written explanations. In turn, that inaccurate
or inadequate information can frustrate others, who will find the system less useful. A
vicious cycle is possible, as everyone begins to doubt that painstaking accuracy and
thoughtful opinions will actually benefit their colleagues. As computer programmers say,
“garbage in, garbage out.”
In short, is naïve to expect, in the words of Judge Sweet, that making sentencing
information available to other judges will “almost automatically” provide “a firmament
of reference points and a body of reasoning” that can “alleviat[e] unwarranted disparity”
between judges. 121 Making relevant sentencing information accessible to judges is
anything but “automatic.”
C. Voluntariness Challenges
Assuming that written, comprehensive, and representative information has been
collected, and the relevant information is accessible, the information sharing model
predicts that judges will seek out that information and treat it as persuasive, perhaps even
authoritative. By design, the model is voluntary, leaving sentencing judges free to decide
whether and how to consult information about previous cases. The idea is not to
constrain judges, but to assist them in the exercise of “fully informed discretion.”122
Information sharing will reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, the
argument goes, because judges who otherwise would have reached a contrary result will
instead conform their sentences those of their colleagues.

number of precedents a trial judge must consult); Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases:
Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20 (1990) (noting that
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SENTENCING: REPORT AND IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE 11-13 (2005), available at http://
www.mosac.mo.gov.
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The unspoken assumption of the model is that the primary source of inter-judge
disparity and irrationality is ignorance. Judges broadly agree about sentencing, on this
view, and reach inconsistent results only because they lack information about how other
courts have handled similar cases. Accordingly, “sentencing disparity would virtually
disappear if judges had access to data about their colleagues’ decisions.” 123
That premise is unrealistic. Inter-judge disparity results not merely from a lack of
information, but from deep disagreements about sentencing values and priorities.
Surveys of judges, for example, have revealed persistent differences of opinion about
important sentencing principles and policies. 124 Judges are particularly divided, for
example, on hot-button criminal justice topics like child pornography, drug trafficking,
and white-collar fraud. 125 My own research on sentencing in the federal system has
documented a sharp spike in inter-judge disparity following the shift from mandatory to
advisory guidelines, 126 despite the absence of any changes in judges’ access to sentencing
information. Other research reveals significant differences in sentencing outcomes
between Democratic and Republican appointees. 127 In light of those basic disagreements,
it is unrealistic to expect that sentencing judges in a voluntary system will dutifully fall
into line when supplied with information about their colleagues’ decisions.
Instead, when judges disagree in good faith with the actions of their colleagues,
there is every reason to believe they will disregard the information and impose a sentence
they believe is just and appropriate. The result will be persistent inter-judge disparity. It
is possible that, over time, voluntary information sharing could foster a “dialogue”
between judges that resolves the disagreement, as courts settle on one view or the other.
But it is equally possible that the disagreement will continue, with dueling courts
committed to opposing views. A purely voluntary model is powerless to correct that
problem. 128
Disregarding the information, moreover, is not the only alternative to falling in
line with other judges’ decisions. Consider three other possibilities. First, judges can
avoid discovering the information in the first place. When judges know or suspect that
their preferred sentence is out of step with those of their colleagues, nothing in a
voluntary system prevents them from simply ignoring the available information. Such a
“see no evil, hear no evil” impulse would thwart the information sharing model in
precisely those cases where it could be most useful.
Second, judges can keep looking. Upon discovering information about past
sentences that run contrary to their own preferences, they can continue to mine the
123
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available opinions in search of more favorable. Behavioral literature on confirmation
bias has documented similar cognitive errors in other contexts. 129 Confirmation bias
describes the tendency to unwittingly select and interpret evidence in a manner that
confirms a previously held belief or hypothesis, while minimizing or failing to recognize
contrary evidence. 130 Previous research has documented confirmation bias among
prosecutors, police, and jurors, 131 and the same tendency undoubtedly exists among
judges. 132
Although concerns about cognitive errors like confirmation bias should not be
overstated, 133 the complexity of sentencing decisions creates conditions that may
facilitate confirmation bias. At a high level of generality, many offenses and offenders
share common characteristics, providing judges with a wealth of “confirming” data points
that may reinforce their intuitions. Yet in the details, sentences are as infinitely variable
as human beings, 134 allowing courts to draw infinite distinctions that minimize the
importance of “disconfirming” data points.
Third, judges can become even more polarized. Judges confronted with
information about previous sentencing patterns may not only reject their colleagues’
approach, but stake out an even more extreme position. That kind of “attitude
polarization” effect finds some support in psychology literature as well. 135 In a seminal
study, for example, test subjects who held opposing views about capital punishment grew
more polarized after reading identical information about conflicting research on the
deterrent effect of the death penalty. 136 As Cass Sunstein has explained, at least when
129
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people begin with strongly held views, a “balanced presentation[]” in which “competing
arguments or positions are laid out side by side” is likely to increase rather than reduce
attitude polarization. 137 Information sharing, in other words, does not inevitably result in
agreement and uniformity. To the contrary, in some circumstances it can harden
individuals’ resolve and make disagreements more pronounced.
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SENTENCING INFORMATION SHARING
These challenges are not merely speculative. New and existing empirical research
tends to confirm the fundamental weaknesses of the information sharing model. This
Article first reports the results of an original study of federal sentencing data collection.
It then examines the history of two reform efforts grounded in the information sharing
model, “sentencing information systems” and “sentencing councils.” Collectively, the
research reinforces the serious challenges related to information collection, information
dissemination, and voluntariness.
A. An Empirical Study of the Collection of Sentencing Information
Virtually no empirical research has examined the collection of sentencing
information. As explained above, the information sharing model depends on a store of
sentencing information that is written, comprehensive, and representative. Promoting
rationality in sentencing decisions requires thoughtful and principled explanations and a
continuing dialogue between judges, which is impossible without written sentencing
opinions. 138 Likewise, comprehensive and representative information is crucial, since a
skewed body of previous decisions can actually deepen inter-judge disparity. 139 No study
has tested the feasibility of that kind of information collection.
To fill that gap, this Article reports the results of an original study of the
collection of sentencing information. Drawing on a unique dataset of sentencing
documents from a federal district court, it evaluates the quantity and characteristics of
written sentence explanations submitted pursuant to mandatory reporting requirements.
Because the documents that form the basis for the analysis are generally nonpublic, the
analysis is the first of its kind in the United States.
1. Data and Coding
The study is based on a key federal sentencing document called the “Statement of
Reasons.” In federal court, sentencing judges must complete a Statement of Reasons in
connection with every criminal sentence. 140 Upon completion, the document is
transmitted to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which extracts and records data about
the sentence. 141 The Commission then generates massive datafiles, based on the contents
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 561-69 (1993) (replicating the Lord et al. study and finding no
attitude polarization when subjects reported their views immediately before reviewing the dueling studies).
137
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of tens of thousands of documents each year, to serve as the basis for statistical reports
about nationwide sentencing practices. To ensure that complete and comprehensive data
are available, the Chief Judge of every federal district court is required by statute to
“ensure” that in every case a “written statement of the reasons for the sentence imposed”
is submitted, in a format specified by the Commission. 142
To understand how the Statement of Reasons works, a brief summary of federal
sentencing practice may be helpful. The U.S. Sentencing Commission has promulgated
detailed sentencing guidelines that translate offense and offender characteristics into a
sentencing range, expressed as a narrow range of months of imprisonment (such as 52-63
months). The guideline range is “advisory,” 143 meaning that judges must “consider” the
advisory guideline range in every case, but they are free to impose any reasonable
sentence consistent with a “laundry list” statute that sets out broad purposes of
punishment. 144 Within-range sentences reflect the sentencing court’s judgment that the
guideline range that is proper for the “mine run” of similar cases, and that the particular
offense and offender are “not different enough to warrant a different sentence.” 145
The Statement of Reasons form is adapted to the guidelines regime. It is four
pages long, and requires that judges provide basic information about the sentence
imposed. 146 Judges must check a box indicating whether the sentence falls within, above,
or below the advisory guideline range. They also have the option of checking boxes that
correspond to reasons for an out-of-guidelines sentence. 147 The checkboxes express the
reasons for the sentence in very general terms, such as “aggravating or mitigating
circumstances” or “the nature and circumstances of the offense.” 148
Most relevant for present purposes, the form provides several spaces in which
judges may provide a narrative description of the reasons for the sentence. 149 The form
states that a written narrative description is “required” in two categories of cases: (1) all
sentences outside the guideline range; and (2) all sentences within the guideline range
that carry a term of imprisonment of “greater than 24 months.”150 Judges sometimes use
the back of the form or attach additional pages or documents, such as a written sentencing
opinion or a transcript of the sentencing hearing.
The Statement of Reasons form is usually secret and confidential, pursuant to a
policy statement issued by the Judicial Conference of the United States. 151 But one
142
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federal district court, the District of Massachusetts, has voted to make Statements of
Reasons available to the public on the PACER system (Public Access to Court Electronic
Records). 152 That decision affords a rare opportunity to study sentencing practices that
remain hidden in every other federal court. The open-access policy reflects the court’s
admirable commitment to greater transparency in criminal sentencing. 153
To assess the kind of information collected using the Statement of Reasons, the
study examines a full year (fiscal year 2006 154) of cases from the District of
Massachusetts. A total of 411 statements were reviewed and coded, representing
approximately 80% of the Statements of Reasons submitted to the Commission that
year. 155 Details concerning document selection are set forth in the Appendix.
Of particular interest is whether the Statements of Reasons supply the kind of
written, comprehensive, and representative explanations necessary to support an effective
information sharing model. Accordingly, the study examines the length of any written
statement explaining the judge’s reasons, measured by the number of sentences of text
contained in the narrative description. Such a “sentence count” admittedly captures only
the length, and not the quality, of the written explanation. But the length of the narrative
description is a fairly reliable proxy for the level of factual detail and the thoroughness of
the judge’s reasoning. The study classifies a narrative description of 1-3 sentences as a
“short” explanation. It classifies a narrative description of 4-9 sentences, at least a
paragraph but less than a page, as a “medium” explanation. It classifies a narrative
description of 10 or more sentences of text, roughly one page, as a “long” explanation.
2. Results
The results are discouraging. As shown in Figure 1, even in cases where a written
explanation of the reasons for the sentence is mandatory, 156 most Statements of Reasons
contain no written explanation at all. Only a small fraction of the documents contain a
comprehensive explanation.
Figure 1: Explanation Provided, Where Written Explanation Is Mandatory
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006 (n = 317)
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For cases in which a written narrative description is required, the Statement of Reasons
contains no indication whatsoever of the judge’s reasons in 48.6% of cases. 157 In another
9.1% of cases, the only indication of the judge’s reasons is a checkmark in a box
corresponding to a broad reason for the decision (such as “aggravating or mitigating
factors” or “the circumstances of the offense”). Together, that means that in 57.7% of
cases—more than half—the document contains no written narrative description, despite
the Commission’s reporting requirements. Such a low rate of written explanations is a
major obstacle for the information sharing model, given the importance of written
opinions in fostering a “dialogue” between sentencing courts, and thereby promoting
rationality in sentencing law. 158
Nor are the available written explanations comprehensive. In 27.1% of cases, the
document provides only a short narrative explanation of up to three sentences of text, and
in another 9.1% of cases it provides a medium-length explanation of 4-9 sentences. That
kind of quick summary represents an improvement over a checklist, but would be of little
157
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use to future courts drawing upon that information to develop a rational body of
sentencing law. The explanation can highlight a few factors that the judge deemed most
important, but of necessity many relevant facts must be omitted, and there can be room
for only a bare-bones explanation of how the judge weighed the competing facts and
considerations. Short-shrift explanations pose a problem for the information sharing
model because incomplete opinions may fail to capture facts that future judges deem
important, masking important similarities or differences between cases and thereby
generating inter-judge disparity and undermining rationality. 159
There is some good news. In a small number of cases (6.0%), the judge provided
a long written explanation consisting of at least 10 sentences of text. Indeed, in a handful
of cases (1.1%), the judge wrote a formal sentencing opinion or attached a hearing
transcript that includes more than 50 sentences of explanation. Those opinions are
outstanding, offering future judges not only a full sense of the relevant facts, but also
valuable insights into the sentencing judge’s reasons and approach.
Unfortunately, those cases tend to be unusual, resulting in a non-representative
body of long written opinions. As shown in Figure 2, sentences outside the guideline
range are more likely to produce a long explanation than sentences within the guideline
range.
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Figure 2: Long Explanation Provided, by Guideline Range
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006 (n = 411)

For sentences within the advisory guideline range, the Statement of Reasons contains a
long explanation, consisting of 10 sentences of text or more, in just 2.5% of cases. But
for sentences outside that range—those different from the “mine run” of similar
cases 160—the likelihood of a long explanation is roughly four times greater. The
documents contain a long explanation for 9.9% of below-range sentences and for 8.3% of
above-range sentences. The result is a skewed collection of long written descriptions.161
A store of sentencing information that consists disproportionately of unusual or extreme
cases poses a real threat to the information sharing model, since a skewed backdrop may
mislead judges about sentencing patterns in cases that are ordinary, but effectively
invisible. 162
The pool of long written explanations is non-representative in another way. Some
judges were far less likely to provide full explanations than others. Figure 3 shows, for
160
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each judge with a criminal caseload of at least 15 sentences during the year of the
study, 163 the percentage of cases in which the judge provided a long written explanation.
Figure 3: Percentage of Cases with Long Explanation, by Judge
Minimum Caseload Required (13 judges total)
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006

Not all judges wrote long explanations of their sentences at equal rates. 164 Six of the 13
judges who met the minimum-caseload requirement did not submit any long explanations
during the year of the study. By contrast, one judge provided a long explanation for
21.1% of sentences, and another provided a long explanation for 33.3% of sentences.
As a result, the pool of sentences with long written explanations is imbalanced,
with some judges far better represented than their colleagues. Judge 13 singlehandedly
accounts for 45% of long opinions submitted the year of the study. That is more than
Judges 1 through 10 combined. Together the court’s three most prolific authors of long
opinions account for 80% of the court’s output of long written explanations. A body of
sentencing information in which some judges have a dominant voice, while others remain
silent, can exacerbate inter-judge disparity and undermine rationality by creating a
distorted impression of actual sentencing patterns. 165
163
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Those differences are not the product of chance. As set forth in the Appendix,
logistic regression models confirm that the pool of written explanations is significantly
imbalanced. 166 First, some judges and some kinds of cases are more likely to produce a
written explanation than others. Non-guideline sentences are significantly and strongly
correlated with written explanations (b = 3.320, p < .001). Likewise, longer terms of
imprisonment are significantly, although more weakly, correlated with written
explanations (b = 0.007, p = .001). Categorical variables capturing the identity of the
sentencing judge are also a significant predictor of whether a written explanation is
provided (p = .001). Surprisingly, however, the fact that a written explanation is
mandatory is not itself a significant predictor of a written explanation, after controlling
for other factors (b = 0.719, p = .214). 167
Second, some kinds of cases are more likely than others to produce a long written
explanation consisting of 10 or more sentences of text. Non-guideline sentences are
significantly correlated with long explanations (b = 1.086, p = .037). Neither sentence
length (b = -0.003, p = .482) nor the fact that a written explanation is mandatory
(b = 1.338, p = .234), however, is a statistically significant predictor of a long
explanation. 168
3. Implications
These findings suggest that challenges in collecting written, comprehensive, and
representative sentencing information are formidable. Even in a regime of detailed and
mandatory reporting requirements, backed by a federal statute, the available pool of
written sentencing opinions is limited.
For three reasons, however, these results should be interpreted with caution. First,
Statements of Reasons are not designed as a way for judges to share information with one
another. At present, their sole audience is the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which uses
the documents as inputs for its statistical reports. No one else has access to the judge’s
statements, no matter how insightful or well-reasoned 169—and judges know it. They
therefore have little incentive (aside from the commands of federal law 170) to explain
their decisions in detail. Data collection efforts surely would improve if judges believed
that their written explanations would reach a wider audience.
Second, the Statement of Reasons form itself is clumsy and cumbersome.
Scarcely concealing its intended use as a data-entry tool for the Commission, it consists
primarily of a “parade of nearly meaningless check boxes.” 171 That format no doubt
discourages judges from providing more thorough narrative descriptions of the reasons
for a sentence. 172 With a more open-ended form that encouraged judges to set out their
reasons, the contents of the statements might be richer and more useful.
166
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Third, this study examines documents from a single federal district court. Data
collection practices in one district may not be representative of practices in other federal
courts nationwide, or in state courts responsible for the vast majority of criminal
sentences. And the District of Massachusetts, admittedly, is far from ordinary when it
comes to sentencing issues. Several members of the court are well-respected as
sentencing experts. Judges Nancy Gertner and William Young have written scholarly
articles on sentencing issues, 173 and Judge Patti Saris now serves as Chair of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission. 174 Moreover, the same commitment to transparency that led the
District of Massachusetts to approve its unique disclosure policy might make its data
reporting practices materially different from those of other courts.
On the other hand, because of the distinctive features of the District of
Massachusetts, this study likely underestimates the challenges in collecting high-quality
sentencing information. Unlike other courts, the District of Massachusetts has
consciously chosen to make its Statements of Reasons widely available. The judges
know that their reasons will not simply be filed away in a drawer, but ordinarily will be
accessible to the public. If anything, the court’s special interest in sentencing likely
translates into more frequent and more thorough written opinions, not less. In addition,
federal judges enjoy a larger support staff, more law clerks, and a slower criminal docket
than their counterparts in state courts. 175 If the collection of sentencing information is
inadequate in the District of Massachusetts—widely recognized as one of the best
sentencing courts in the country—then it is probably even worse elsewhere.
The study thus reinforces that information collection challenges are substantial.
Despite explicit reporting requirements, sentencing courts face time pressures and other
constraints that prevent them from routinely providing written, comprehensive, and
representative information.
B. Research on Previous Reform Efforts
In addition to this original research, insights about the information sharing model
can be derived from the experiences of previous sentencing reform efforts grounded in
information sharing. Two efforts are particularly salient: (1) “sentencing information
systems,” searchable computer databases of sentencing information constructed in a
handful of jurisdictions around the world; and (2) “sentencing councils,” periodic
roundtable discussions of sentencing judges on the same court. The struggles of those
reform efforts, and their occasional successes, underscore serious challenges with
information dissemination and voluntariness.
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1. Sentencing Information Systems
In the last 25 years, a handful of jurisdictions worldwide has experimented with
sentencing information systems (SISs), searchable electronic databases of sentencing
information. Although their designs vary, the goal of SISs is to enable judges to look up
statistics, case summaries, written opinions, or other information about previous
sentences in similar cases. 176 Using interactive search forms, a judge preparing to impose
sentence enters some key characteristics of the case. The SIS responds by reporting
information about matching cases. Some systems provide only aggregated information
about whole categories of cases, such as the distribution of nationwide sentences for
aggravated theft. Others provide specific information about individual cases, such as the
case summary or full sentencing opinion in a relevant case. 177 Courts in Canada,
Scotland, Ireland, and Australia have launched large-scale experiments with SISs. 178 In
the United States, Missouri has constructed a web-based system that could be described
as an SIS. 179
The primary goals of an SIS, in the jurisdictions that have adopted them, are to
reduce inter-judge sentencing disparity and to promote rationality. 180 When a judge
sentences an offender, an SIS can provide a statistical picture of how similar offenders
have been sentenced before, by other judges in the same court, region, or nation. 181
Making better information available to judges, the argument goes, makes it possible for
judges to align their decisions with those of their colleagues, and thus produces more
consistent and better-reasoned sentences. 182
Surprisingly, to date no empirical research has examined whether any SIS has
succeeded in reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity. 183 The indirect evidence,
however, is disheartening. Many of the most prominent SISs in foreign courts have been
abandoned. Further, in jurisdictions where SISs have survived, they have taken on more
of a support role following the implementation of other structured sentencing reforms.
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In Canada, four provinces experimented with SISs in the late 1980s. 184 A
national sentencing commission had concluded that “detailed information on current
practices” would prove valuable to sentencing judges, 185 and surveys of judges had
revealed a widespread appetite for better information about past sentencing outcomes.186
Although judges were not required to search the Canadian SIS when imposing sentence,
the designers worked closely with judges to design useful and relevant search
parameters. 187
It did not work. Within a few years, the Canadian SIS experiment was abandoned
because judges declined to use it. 188 The system’s architect attributed its demise to the
fact that the reform was strictly voluntary. He was surprised to discover that “[j]udges do
not, as a rule, care to know what sentences other judges are handing down in comparable
cases.” 189 Judges were especially reluctant to use the system, he reported, “if they knew
(or thought) that these other judges have different approaches” than their own. 190
Similarly, in Scotland, an SIS was developed for judges of the High Court of
Justiciary, which handles sentencing for some of the nation’s most serious criminal
offenses. Following a trial period in 1997, the SIS became available to all of the court’s
judges in 2002. Judges themselves proposed developing the system, principally as a
defensive measure to head off more intrusive reforms (such as presumptive sentencing
guidelines) that would have sharply limited their discretion. 191 As in Canada, judges
worked closely with designers of the SIS to define the available search parameters. 192
The result, according to its creators, was a highly flexible and valuable resource. 193
Yet the Scottish SIS collapsed as well. In 2006, just a few years after the system
became widely available, the Sentencing Commission of Scotland reported that the
system “was not widely used” and had “largely fallen into abeyance.” 194 Judges “rarely”
used the system to gather information, and “rarely” took the time to enter narrative
information concerning their own sentencing decisions. 195 The data were also incomplete
and at times inaccurate. 196 The Commission found that “currently the SIS does not have
anything other than the most marginal of impacts on the imposition of sentences.” 197 In
184
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2010 one of the designers of the system proclaimed that the SIS is essentially nonoperational, having been “allowed to atrophy” following years of judicial neglect. 198
Australia boasts the world’s most successful SIS, at least measured by longevity.
The Judicial Commission of New South Wales has maintained a searchable database of
sentencing statistics since 1988. 199 Strangely, in the 24 years of its operation, no effort
has been undertaken to evaluate its effectiveness. There is evidence that some judges in
actually use the system by performing searches, 200 but no research concerning its effects
on sentencing outcomes.
Over time, however, the New South Wales system has been relegated to a support
role. Beginning in 1998, the Supreme Court of New South Wales began to announce
“guideline judgments,” which specified an advisory sentencing range for offenses. 201 In
2003, the New South Wales General Assembly enacted “standard non-parole sentencing
periods” 202—essentially a statutory determinate sentencing scheme 203—that set
presumptive sentences for many serious offenses. Judges are now permitted to depart
from the legislatively-prescribed sentence, but only upon finding facts justifying a
departure. 204 The General Assembly concluded that, despite the availability of the SIS,
inter-judge sentencing disparity had reached unacceptable levels. The primary reason for
the new regime, according to its supporters, was to reduce that form of disparity. 205
Promising new SISs are underway around the world, and they may provide new
insights on the information sharing model. Ireland’s criminal courts launched a new,
publicly accessible web-based SIS in 2010. 206 Australia recently launched a nationwide
SIS, modeled on the New South Wales system, for federal offenses prosecuted
throughout the country. 207 In the United States, Missouri has rolled out a web-based
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system for disseminating statistics and other sentencing information. 208 And at least
preliminary work has begun on SIS-type efforts in Israel and England and in state courts
in Oregon. 209 So far, however, those systems have not been the subject of careful
research, and their future is uncertain.
2. Sentencing Councils
The experience of “sentencing councils,” another sentencing reform effort
grounded in the information sharing model, is also instructive. Sentencing councils were
groups of district judges, serving on the same court, who met regularly (typically once
per week) to discuss upcoming sentencing decisions. 210 Four federal district courts, in
Brooklyn, Chicago, Detroit, and Oregon, experimented with sentencing councils in the
1960s and 1970s. 211 The councils functioned as roundtable discussions of upcoming
cases. In advance of the meeting, all participating judges, including the judge responsible
for imposing sentence, would review the presentence report and other materials and make
an initial recommendation about the appropriate sentence. As a group, judges would then
talk about the evidence, share their views about the most important facts and
considerations, and try to persuade one another. 212 Nancy Gertner has compared
sentencing councils to clinical rounds performed by physicians. 213
The principal goal of sentencing councils was to reduce inter-judge disparity. 214
Sentencing councils provided the sentencing judge with detailed, case-specific
information about how other judges would respond to each new set of facts. Participating
judges saw the work of sentencing councils as an “educational process” in which judges
could “pool[] [their] knowledge and experience and learn[] from each other.” 215 Sharing
information about how other judges would handle the case, they predicted, “will likely
have the effect of ameliorating the likelihood of sentence disparity.” 216
Consistent with the information sharing model, sentencing councils were
voluntary in two ways. First, the recommendations of other judges at the sentencing
council were merely advisory. The sentencing judge retained sole discretion to impose
the final sentence. 217 To goal was to assist, not to restrain: “No attempt is made at these
Councils to impose the will of one upon another.” 218 Second, in some districts,
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participation in the sentencing council was itself optional, and not all judges elected to
attend the meetings. 219
Participating judges raved. 220 They found the discussions valuable, reporting that
they frequently changed their views about the appropriate sentence in response to their
colleagues’ advice. 221 The discussions, by all accounts, were informal and friendly.
Outside observers were uniformly impressed with the seriousness and care with which
sentencing councils approached each case. 222
Yet two major research projects found that sentencing councils did not
meaningfully reduce inter-judge sentencing disparity. 223 Shari Diamond and Hans Zeisel
studied the effects of sentencing councils in Brooklyn and Chicago by comparing
sentencing judges’ initial recommendations with their final sentences. They found strong
evidence of inter-judge disparity in the initial recommendations, with judges apart on
average by 36.7% in Chicago and 45.5% in Brooklyn. 224 In their evaluation of cases, the
data showed, “some judges are clearly more severe than others.” 225 But sentencing
councils alleviated only a small fraction of that disparity. Diamond and Zeisel found that
final sentences imposed, after full discussion with the sentencing council, remained apart
on average by 35.4% in Chicago and 41.1% in Brooklyn. 226 They estimated, therefore,
that sentencing councils reduced inter-judge disparity by just 4% to 10%. 227
Another study, commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), examined the
effects of sentencing councils in Detroit, Chicago, and Brooklyn. 228 Focusing on five
offense types, the FJC study compared levels of inter-judge disparity in the years before
and after the establishment of the sentencing council. The results were discouraging. 229
In every district, inter-judge disparity actually increased for some offenses, even as it
decreased for others. 230 Based on the mixed results, the study concluded that “councils
may increase disparity as frequently as they decrease it.” 231
The experiment did not last. By the mid-1980s, sentencing councils in the federal
courts were abandoned.
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3. Lessons for the Information Sharing Model
The experiences of SISs and sentencing councils highlight some of the
fundamental weaknesses of the information sharing model. Challenges in disseminating
sentencing information have resulted in struggles, and even the collapse, of several SISs
around the world. Both reform efforts also have suffered from voluntariness problems,
with sentencing courts too often disregarding, ignoring, or rejecting the available
information.
a. Information Dissemination
Strikingly, in jurisdictions in which SISs have struggled or even collapsed, the
most frequently cited reasons have been practical difficulties with disseminating the
information in a useful way. No system can survive for long if its users—judges and
their court staff—find it cumbersome, confusing, or unhelpful.
Scotland’s SIS offers the clearest example. Judges themselves proposed the
development of the system, as a tool to improve inter-judge consistency and rationality.
They understood that the success of the project depended on a collective effort, since
every narrative description they wrote would be added to a searchable database available
to their colleagues. And they had strong practical incentives to make it work because the
SIS was launched in part to short-circuit proposals for more intrusive reforms like
sentencing guidelines. 232 Yet in just a few years the system fell into disuse, with judges
rarely searching for relevant information about past sentencing practice. 233
Complexity was one part of the problem. Although the system’s designers
worked with judges in selecting search parameters, and boasted about the system’s ease
of use and flexibility, judges reported that they found the system’s search tools
frustrating. 234 As system designers around the world have acknowledged, an SIS cannot
remain neutral with respect to the factors that are most relevant at sentencing. 235
Privileging some factors while excluding others inevitably discourages some users from
accessing the available information.
Volume was another. In rolling out the Scottish SIS, system designers had to
train judges never to enter more than a few parameters at once, because the system almost
always returned too few cases. 236 Other systems have encountered the opposite problem.
Designers of a fledgling SIS in Israel declined to include “detailed descriptions” or even
“summaries” of cases because, given the large number of results, “it was felt that judges
would not take the time to read case descriptions.” 237
Those problems can compound one another. Following the launch of the Scottish
SIS, judges who found the system cumbersome and unhelpful did not always make time
to enter detailed and accurate information about their sentences. 238 Such shortcuts and
errors made the system less useful, reinforcing other judges’ sense that the effort of
232
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producing detailed opinions was a waste of time and energy. 239 The result was a vicious
cycle in which the system gradually atrophied and ultimately collapsed.
Privacy concerns also have hampered the success of SISs. With few exceptions,
SISs have been made available only to judges and court personnel, with no access to
defense counsel, prosecutors, or the public. 240 In part, not to the judges’ credit, that kind
of secrecy was designed to shield sentencing decisions from public scrutiny and
criticism. 241 But in part it also reflected legitimate concerns about disclosing deeply
personal information about the lives of offenders, family members, and victims. 242 In the
handful of systems that are publicly accessible, privacy concerns do not arise either
because the information is expressed entirely in the aggregate (as in Missouri), or because
records are anonymous and little detailed case-specific information is available (as in
Ireland).
b. Voluntariness
The abandonment of sentencing councils and the struggles of SISs also undermine
a key assumption of the information sharing model. For information sharing to reduce
inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, judges must respond to information about
previous sentences in similar cases by conforming their decisions to those of their
colleagues. The history of these reform efforts makes clear that judges frequently
respond differently, by disregarding the information, ignoring it entirely, or even shifting
to a more extreme position.
Researchers cited voluntariness as the principal reason that sentencing councils
failed to meaningfully reduce inter-judge disparity. Michael Tonry reasoned that
sentencing councils had little effect because “[t]he council recommendations are only
advisory,” leaving judges who disagree with their colleagues free to disregard the
advice. 243 The FJC study concurred, noting that it should come as no surprise that a
strictly voluntary “self-reform” that preserved “broad discretion” for sentencing judges
did not meaningfully affect sentencing outcomes. 244 Surprisingly, even where judges
consciously sought out the advice of their colleagues—in courts where participation in
the sentencing council was optional—the effects on inter-judge disparity were
negligible. 245 As long as the sentencing judge had the final word, sentencing councils
had little effect. 246
In addition, as the experiences of SISs and sentencing councils make clear, judges
may decline to look up the information in the first place. The Canadian SIS fell into
239
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disuse because, in the words of the chief designer, “[j]udges do not, as a rule, care to
know what sentences other judges are handing down in comparable cases.” 247
Particularly troubling is evidence that Canadian judges were especially unlikely to
consult the SIS “if they knew (or thought) that these other judges have different
approaches” than their own. 248 That kind of reluctance prevents the information sharing
model from reducing inter-judge disparity in precisely the category of cases where it
holds the most promise. Similarly, participation in sentencing councils was spotty when
judges’ attendance was optional. In the Northern District of Illinois, five of the court’s
14 judges regularly participated in the sentencing council, bringing more than 60% of
their cases before the sentencing council. 249 But six of the court’s judges elected never to
participate, and three others participated only occasionally, bringing less than 50% of
their cases before the council. 250 The result was that only one-third of criminal sentences
benefited from the council’s advice. 251 Some judges resisted the procedure on the ground
that it would intrude upon their independent judgment at sentencing, and that it would be
a “waste of time.” 252
Experience with SISs also point to the risk of confirmation bias when consulting a
large body of sentencing information. Consider the operation of the New South Wales
system. Judges can enter a few search parameters and generate a histogram that shows a
distribution of prior sentences. 253 For example, for offenders (1) under the age of 21,
who (2) plead guilty, (3) to driving while intoxicated, the SIS may report that 29% of
offenders received probationary sentences, 24% received sentences of imprisonment,
21% received intermediate sentences, and 15% received compound sentences. 254 In
theory, judges could review the written opinions in each of the approximately 120 cases
summarized in the chart, attentive to factors that may be present in a new case that fits
those criteria. Equally likely, however, given the volume of matching cases and limited
time, judges could focus on cases that confirm the result they already have in mind.
Attitude polarization is also a risk, according to the research. The FJC study of
sentencing councils found troubling evidence that, at least for some offenses, the
introduction of the councils coincided with an increase in inter-judge disparity. 255 The
study speculated that when judges at a sentencing council “meet, for the first time,
opposition to their ideas” about sentencing, the experience “may result in movement to a
more extreme position.” 256 Alternatively, judges with more extreme views “may
convince moderate judges to follow their more lenient or harsh sentencing patterns.” 257
Better information about other judges’ actions, in other words, did not necessarily bring
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about consensus and greater inter-judge consistency. It sometimes had the opposite
effect, serving as a “catalyst[] for the airing of latent disagreements.” 258
The research thus undermines a key assumption of the information sharing model.
As Marc Miller has observed, the power of sentencing information to reduce inter-judge
disparity “depends on how judges use the information . . . to guide their own sentencing
judgments.” 259 The experiences of SISs and sentencing councils show that judges do not
necessarily respond to better information in ways that promote inter-judge consistency
and rationality.
IV. MAKING INFORMATION SHARING WORK
Based on new and existing research, there is ample reason for skepticism about
the information sharing model. Fundamental weaknesses related to the collection,
dissemination, and voluntariness of sentencing information make information sharing
highly unattractive as an alternative to other structured sentencing models.
Yet there is also reason for optimism. Information sharing at sentencing may yet
perform a valuable function as a supplement to other reforms. Despite the mixed track
record of previous experiments, it is entirely possible that information sharing can
contribute to inter-judge consistency and rationality under the right conditions. In
particular, two features of a sentencing system that can improve the effectiveness of
information sharing: (1) a system of sentencing guidelines, whether advisory or
mandatory; and (2) open access to the store of sentencing information for defense counsel
and prosecutors. Each of those features, the preceding discussion suggests, helps to
address key weaknesses of the information sharing model.
A. Sentencing Guidelines
In light of its weaknesses, best way to implement the information sharing model
may be as an adjunct to a system of sentencing guidelines. As explained above, under a
typical set of sentencing guidelines, the judge must make a series of factual
determinations about the offense and offender. Based on those facts, the guidelines
specify a sentence or a sentencing range. Depending on the jurisdiction, that range may
be binding in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, or it may be merely
advisory. 260 A set of sentencing guidelines, whether mandatory or advisory, can make
information sharing more effective in promoting inter-judge consistency and rationality.
That is because guidelines perform several functions—defining terms, operationalizing
complex factors, and channeling the attention of sentencing courts—that make
information sharing easier.
First, sentencing guidelines define terms and create a shared vocabulary for
discussions of sentencing. As Marc Miller has explained, sentencing guidelines “create a
language of familiar terms and concepts” among sentencing judges, and that kind of
“social language” makes it easier for sentencing judges to understand one another.261
Guideline systems may define and popularize terms of art like “vulnerable victim,”
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“substantial assistance,” or “role in the offense,” for example, that offer sentencing
judges a succinct way of describing otherwise imprecise categories and concepts. 262
Second, systems of sentencing guidelines “operationalize” complex sentencing
factors like criminal history. Calculating a guideline sentencing range may depend, for
example, on whether the offender has a previous criminal record. Or it may depend on
the number of prior convictions, or the seriousness of those convictions. Or it may
depend on an elaborate scoring system that awards more “criminal history points” for
some kinds of offenses (e.g. felonies or violent crimes) than for others (e.g. juvenile
offenses or older convictions). 263 In the same manner, guidelines systems operationalize
a whole host of other factors, such as the offender’s mental state, role in the offense, and
the harm caused to victims. It does not matter, for information sharing purposes, whether
the guidelines consider factors in a sensible or principled way. Simply by choosing one
method of taking those factors into account, a system of guidelines sets a useful baseline.
Third, sentencing guidelines channel the court’s attention to a standard set of facts
and considerations. Some systems, like the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, attempt to
account for a dizzying number of factors, forcing judges to engage in extensive and
intricate factfinding. 264 Other systems are much simpler, taking into account fewer facts
and circumstances and making more general recommendations. But all guidelines
systems focus the court’s attention on some set of especially salient offense and offender
information. Even if the guideline sentencing range is advisory, the process of
determining that range is important.
Those basic functions of a guidelines system help to address some of the major
weaknesses of the information sharing model. One set of challenges relates to the
collection of sentencing information. The complexity and volume of sentencing
decisions makes it difficult to collect written, comprehensive, and representative
sentencing information. 265 By channeling the efforts of sentencing courts, and requiring
that the judge always address some standard set of questions, sentencing guidelines
ensure the availability of a basic level of information about every case. That minimum
level of information reduces (although it certainly does not eliminate) the risk that noncomprehensive information might mislead future sentencing courts and thereby generate
inter-judge disparity. Guidelines also guard against a skewed and non-representative
pool of cases because the standard set of findings is required from all judges and in all
kinds of cases. It is also possible that routinely answering a standard set of questions
may also change sentencing judges’ habits in a way that encourages more written
opinions, although overly complex guidelines may have the opposite effect.
Sentencing guidelines also help to address challenges with the dissemination of
sentencing information. 266 By operationalizing important sentencing factors, sentencing
guidelines provide a baseline set of categories and concepts that judges can use when
searching for similar and relevant cases. In addition, by supplying a common vocabulary
among sentencing judges, guidelines can make search results easier to understand, reduce
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errors based on inconsistent terminology, and generally reduce the risk of user frustration.
Of course, a sentencing information system need not simply replicate the categories and
concepts developed in the guidelines. 267 Still, a framework of sentencing guidelines,
with its shared language and baseline understanding of key factors, improves the chances
that judges can use the information effectively.
Admittedly, to date no research has established that information sharing can
reduce inter-judge disparity or promote rationality. At the same time, however, the
experiences of SISs and sentencing councils do not foreclose the possibility of successful
information sharing within a system of sentencing guidelines. In each of the jurisdictions
where SISs have failed, they were “stand-alone” systems in which judges received little
guidance about sentencing. 268 Similarly, sentencing councils operated in a pre-reform era
in federal court, with little external guidance for sentencing judges. 269 Perhaps it is no
coincidence that the most successful information sharing experiments, such as the SIS
developed in New South Wales, have survived alongside other forms of structured
sentencing like guideline judgments and standard non-parole periods. 270 Because of the
basic functions they perform, a system of sentencing guidelines likely would improve the
chances that information sharing can succeed.
B. Open Access
Another way to improve the information sharing model is to publicize the store of
sentencing information. The body of written opinions and statistical information, along
with any specialized search tools, could be made available to defense counsel and
prosecutors—not just the court. Publicly sharing information about sentencing would
have obvious benefits for the criminal justice system as a whole. 271 But open access
would be of particular value in overcoming challenges related to voluntariness and the
dissemination of sentencing information.
As discussed above, one major obstacle to effective information sharing at
sentencing is time. Sentencing judges cannot afford routinely to sift through mountains
of information about previous cases to ensure that their decisions are compatible with
those of their colleagues. The experiences of sentencing councils and SISs reveal when
judges decline to consult available information, they frequently cite time constraints as a
primary reason. The complexity and volume of sentencing decisions, which make it
difficult to design user-friendly search tools, can compound the problem by making
judges less inclined to track down relevant cases.
Open access would ease the burden on judges by transferring much of the casematching legwork to the lawyers. In their briefs and at sentencing hearing, the parties
could take the lead in identifying potentially relevant cases. That would reduce the risk
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of errors in identifying relevant cases, thereby promoting inter-judge consistency. 272
Although open access would mean more work for counsel, there is reason to think that
lawyers would avail themselves of the information. A store of information about
previous sentences would be one more weapon in counsel’s arsenal in preparation for
sentencing. As an example, a decade ago, the Office of the Federal Public Defender in
the District of Massachusetts began compiling a publicly available collection of
downward departure decisions, sorted by offense type and judge, as a way to improve
advocacy on behalf of criminal defendants. 273
At the same time, open access would increase the likelihood that the court will
take the information seriously. At sentencing, as in other contexts, judges make a point
of responding to the specific contentions raised by the parties. Although the information
sharing model by design does not compel judges to give weight to any particular factors
at sentencing, even judges who would not independently seek out information about
previous sentences might respond to a well-formed argument by the prosecutor or
defense counsel.
In addition, open access could promote rationality by improving the quality of the
judge’s reasoning. Vigorous advocacy is a great asset to a sentencing court. The parties
can draw parallels between cases, debate possible points of distinction, and urge the
judge to accept or reject the reasoning of their colleagues. It is possible, of course, that
the parties might use the store of sentencing information to stake out extreme positions
that provide little help to the court. 274 Yet adversarial testing of those arguments in
principle should help judges to reach more thoughtful and principled outcomes.
The major drawback to open access is the privacy of sentencing information.
Written opinions and other sentencing documents may disclose deeply personal
information about offenders, victims, family members, and witnesses. For offenders and
witnesses who cooperate with the government, open access might even create a risk of
violent retaliation. 275
It may be possible to ameliorate those privacy concerns by partially withholding
or redacting sensitive information made available to others. 276 But too much redaction
could defeat the purpose, undermining the effectiveness of the information sharing
model. Because personal information often plays a critical role in sentencing outcomes,
concealing that information may render written opinions unhelpful, or even
incomprehensible, to future judges and lawyers.
Although there is no easy way of determining how to withhold or redact
information, two strategies might prove useful. First, because most sentencing
information does not raise serious privacy concerns, case information could be presumed
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accessible unless the parties or the court request that it be sealed. Defense attorneys and
prosecutors would have incentives not to overuse that power, since they stand to benefit
from more complete information in future cases. Second, the system could be designed
to withhold private information only from the parties, while allowing judges access to
complete information. That way, even if counsel does not fully understand the facts and
reasoning of a previous decision, the sentencing judge can take them into account.
Neither a system of sentencing guidelines nor open access to sentencing
information can guarantee the success of the information sharing model. Its fundamental
weaknesses, along with the poor track record of previous reform efforts, provide ample
reason for skepticism. Yet sentencing guidelines and open access would help to address
challenges related to the collection, dissemination, and voluntariness of sentencing
information. They give the information sharing model its best chance to succeed.
CONCLUSION
The information sharing model is often advertised as a method of reducing interjudge disparity and promoting rationality in sentencing law. The argument is that by
assembling a body of written opinions and other information about past sentences, judges
can align their sentences with those of their colleagues.
This Article has identified three fundamental weaknesses in that model. First,
there are daunting information collection challenges. Because of the complexity and
volume of sentencing decisions, it is difficult for courts to generate sentencing
information that is written, comprehensive, and representative. Second, there are
challenges in disseminating sentencing information in a useful way. Privacy interests on
the part of offenders and others raise serious concerns. In addition, as a practical matter,
it is difficult to make the large volume of relevant information available to judges in a
useful format. Third, the voluntariness of the information sharing model is an important
drawback. Judges retain the discretion to ignore or reject colleagues’ reasoning,
undermining inter-judge consistency and rationality.
New and existing research reinforces each of those weaknesses. The Article
contains an original study of information-collection practices in the only federal court
that makes key sentencing documents public. It finds that, despite mandatory reporting
requirements, the court rarely provides the kind of written explanation needed to support
the information sharing model. The history of two other reform efforts, sentencing
information systems and sentencing councils, reveals how voluntariness and challenges
with information dissemination can frustrate information sharing at sentencing. As the
FJC study of sentencing councils concluded, history is discouraging for “those who see
disparity as a problem that can be solved by better communication among judges.” 277
More than anything, this “skeptic’s guide” makes a plea for realism about what
the information sharing model can accomplish. But information sharing at sentencing is
in its infancy, and the claim here is therefore modest. There is reason for skepticism that
information sharing can serve as an alternative to other structured sentencing reforms
aimed at improving inter-judge consistency and rationality. But information sharing has
real potential as a supplement to other efforts. In particular, its odds of success would
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greatly improve if implemented as part of a system of sentencing guidelines, and with
open access to the information for defense counsel and prosecutors.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix provides additional details concerning case selection and coding
for the empirical study, along with detailed regression results.
A. Case Selection
The study examines Statement of Reasons documents (SORs) for sentences
imposed in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in fiscal year
2006, which runs from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006. As noted above, the
District of Massachusetts is the only federal district court that makes the documents
public, by posting them on the PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records)
system as part of the case docket. 278
The SORs were collected as part of a related study of inter-judge sentencing
disparity, and the Technical Appendix to that article provides background information.279
PACER supports case searches by filing date and closing date, but not by the date of
sentencing. 280 To identify cases that may include a sentence imposed in fiscal year 2006,
the initial search extended to every criminal case filed in the district between January 1,
2000, and June 30, 2006. 281 The vast majority of results, including dismissals,
jurisdictional transfers, and acquittals, were ignored because they did not produce a
sentence during the relevant period.
The result was a body of 411 SORs for sentences imposed in fiscal year 2006.
The Sentencing Commission reports that the district as a whole submitted documentation
for 512 sentences that year. 282 The SORs examined here therefore represent 80.3% of the
total. There are several possible explanations for the missing SORs. First, although the
District of Massachusetts generally makes SORs available on PACER, in some cases the
SOR is unavailable, or the docket indicates that the SOR is sealed. Judges retain the
power to seal the SOR for case-specific reasons, such as the protection of offenders or
witnesses who have cooperated with the government. 283 Second, cases filed before 2000
with a sentence in 2006—for example, cases extended by appeal and remand or complex
conspiracy cases with many defendants—would have escaped the initial search. Thus,
although the available set of 411 documents includes more than 80% of the total, it is not
complete.
Nor are the available SORs necessarily a random sample of the total. It is
possible that SORs that do not appear on PACER differ in important ways, such as the
level of written explanation provided, from the SORs that are available. Fortunately, as
Table A1 indicates, the SORs available on PACER differ only slightly from the total
population of SORs submitted to the Commission:
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Table A1: Comparison of All SORs and Available SORs
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006 284

Total Cases
Imprisonment Ordered
Average Prison Sentence
Within Guideline Range
Below Guideline Range
Above Guideline Range

All SORs
FY 2006
512
87.6%
73.0 months
74.1%
24.8%
1.2%

Available on
PACER
411
81.8%
78.1 months
67.4%
29.7%
2.9%

Although modest, potential differences between the available SORs on PACER and the
full pool of SORs submitted to the Commission are a reason for caution.
B. Coding
To measure the level of written explanation contained in each SOR, a research
assistant counted the total number of sentences of text provided. The count included
written explanations from all three of the SOR form’s narrative description fields. It also
included written explanations contained in any attachments, such as published sentencing
opinions and hearing transcripts. In those cases, however, the count included only
portions of the opinion or proceeding in which the judge provided reasons for the
sentence imposed. It excluded, for example, discussion of guideline calculations,
constitutional challenges, and procedural matters.
In some cases, the SOR contains only a generic statement with no discussion of
the particular offense or offender. As an example, some SORs state: “I have considered
the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and I have imposed a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to achieve those purposes.” 285 Because generic statements of that kind
merely restate the judge’s task, without providing any explanation of the sentence
imposed, they were coded as zero sentences of explanatory text.
In addition, SOR forms were coded for whether any checkboxes were marked to
explain the sentence. The “checkbox” condition was considered satisfied if any
checkbox was marked in any section of the SOR form that lists reasons for the sentence.
Checkboxes unrelated to the reasons for the sentence, such as those describing whether a
fine was imposed or the presentence report was adopted, did not satisfy the checkbox
condition.
The study reports the results of two logistic regression models, each based on a
different dependent variable. Logistic regression was necessary because both dependent
variables are binary rather than normally distributed. The first is whether the SOR
contains any written explanation of the sentence. If the SOR contains zero sentences of
explanatory text, then the dependent variable is coded as zero. If the SOR contains one
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or more sentences of explanatory text, then the dependent variable is coded as one. A
mark in a checkbox was not coded as a form of written explanation.
The second is whether the SOR contains a “long” written explanation, consisting
of at least 10 sentences of text. That cutoff corresponds to roughly one page of narrative
description, and was considered a reasonable proxy for the kind of explanation sufficient
to provide meaningful information about the reasons for the sentence to another judge. If
the SOR contains 10 or more sentences of explanatory text, then the dependent variable is
coded as one. If the SOR contains fewer than nine sentences, then the dependent variable
is coded as zero.
Both models include the following independent variables:
(1) Sentence length, in months. Sentence length is coded as length of the term of
imprisonment, measured in months. Consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s
practice, sentences of probation were coded as zero months of imprisonment. 286
(2) Non-guideline sentence, an indicator. Non-guideline sentences include
sentences above or below the guideline sentencing range, whether styled as a “departure,”
a post-Booker “variance,” or using another term. Following the Commission’s
conventions, government-sponsored below-range sentences were coded as within range.
(3) Within-range sentences of more than 24 months, an indicator. This dummy
variable was coded because the SOR form requires a written narrative explanation for
that category of sentences, but not for other within-range sentences.
(4) Sentence of time served, and indicator. Sentences of “time served” present
special challenges. In the federal system, offenders may receive credit for time served in
official detention prior to sentencing. 287 It is common for a judge to impose a sentence of
time served, allowing the offender to be released immediately. The sentence is not zero
months of imprisonment because the offender is credited by statute for serving time. But
SOR forms sometimes list the sentence simply as “time served,” with no indication of the
length of presentence detention for which the offender has been credited. Lacking more
precise information, sentences of time served were coded as zero months of
imprisonment, but an additional dummy indicator was added to permit analysis of those
cases.
In addition, one model uses dummy variables that capture the identity of the
sentencing judge. To avoid the distorting effects of judges with low caseloads, such as
those in senior status, those models exclude sentences by judges with fewer than 15
sentences during the fiscal year. 288 Following standard practice for categorical variables,
one judge was omitted as a reference category. The second model, based on long
explanations, does not include judge dummy variables because too many judges
submitted no long explanations during the year of the study.
C. Regression Results
The first model describes factors that predict whether the Statement of Reasons
contains any written explanation. Table 1 reports the results:
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Table 1: Logistic Regression Model
Written Explanation Provided
Variable
(Constant)
Sentence Length
Sentence of Time Served
Non-Guideline Sentence
Within-Range Over 24 Months
Judge Identity (categorical)

Coefficient
-1.153
0.007
0.409
3.320
0.719

Model significance: <.001*
Chi-square: 183.866

Standard Error
0.676
0.002
0.900
0.392
0.579

Significance
.088
.001*
.649
<.001*
.214
.001*

* Significant at the .05 level
n = 398

The model indicates that some kinds of sentences are more likely to produce a written
explanation than others. Non-guideline sentences, longer terms of imprisonment, and the
identity of the judge are significantly correlated with written explanations. A withinrange sentence of more than 24 months, however, is not a significant predictor of a
written explanation, after controlling for other factors. That casts doubt on the
effectiveness of SOR form’s instructions, which require a written explanation in those
circumstances.
The second model describes factors that predict whether the Statement of Reasons
contains a long written explanation of 10 or more sentences. Table 2 reports the results:
Table 2: Logistic Regression Model
Long Explanation (10+ sentences) Provided
Variable
(Constant)
Sentence Length
Non-Guideline Sentence
Within-Range Over 24 Months

Coefficient
-4.495
-0.003
1.086
1.338

Model significance: <.001*
Chi-square: 11.185

Standard Error
1.006
0.004
0.519
1.124

Significance
<.001*
.482
.037*
.234

* Significant at the .05 level
n = 408

Non-guideline sentences are significantly correlated with long explanations. Neither
sentence length nor within-range sentences above 24 months, however, is a statistically
significant predictor of a long explanation.
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